



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

achievement quite as keenly as the greatness and certainty of his victory. If Hegel had a positive dislike of the truth or half-truth that there is always an unattainable "beyond," Browning is for ever insisting on this "beyond." He is not only the poet of "immanence," he is not less the singer of that "something evermore about to be" of which Wordsworth wrote. His insistence on the idea of immortality is one of the ways in which this sense of imperfection shows itself, and perhaps no words of his have gone more piercingly home to his readers' hearts than those in which he gives a voice to the hope that a day will come when "the broken arcs" will be seen as a "perfect round." In writing of immortality he sometimes falls below the height of his "supreme utterances," and it may be that in his use of the idea he gave an imaginative rather than a philosophical expression to a spiritual truth. But however this may be, our point is that, in Browning's poetic faith, the sense of imperfection and of the difference between the divine and human is not less strong than the poet's optimism and his sense of a divine presence in humanity. These are, as Professor Jones would probably say, only two aspects of a single truth. He will make his exposition still more satisfactory, and will render a further service to his readers, if in a second edition he gives greater relief to the first of them, and shows more at length how it may philosophically be united with those ideas on which he has dealt with so sympathetic an understanding and so unforced an eloquence.

A. C. BRADLEY.

RIDDLES OF THE SPHINX: a Study in the Philosophy of Evolution. By a Troglodyte. London (Sonnenschein, 1891).

Systems of metaphysics are seldom written at all; but still more seldom does the philosophical reader meet with a system conceived with such freshness of mind and expounded with such vigor and buoyancy of style that it persuades and entertains him, even where he is disposed to question its conclusions. The Troglodyte writes from the Cave, to which, as in duty bound, he has returned; but he has been in the upper world, and describes what he has seen with a confidence which recalls some of the best days of metaphysics. The flippant may suggest that it is easy under the circumstances to mistake the moon for the sun. But it is something to have seen the moon; and the Troglodyte's luminary, whichever he has seen, is sufficiently dazzling. In a word, the book is of such ability and originality that no serious reader can help admiring it, and learning much from its happy combination of the constructive gift with sceptical insight into the difficulties of philosophical problems.

Though a work of metaphysics, it possesses ethical interest. The author regards the questions of philosophy as ultimately questions of practical life; and, according to the order which he follows in the exposition, it is the impossibility of squaring current philosophy with the requirements of practical life which leads him to attempt yet another solution. His system is offered as an alternative to pessimism, which, taken in its widest sense as the belief that the universe whether of action or of thought is not rational, he treats as the outcome of agnosticism. Agnosticism leads to scepticism, and this to pessimism. Agnosticism both in its Spencerian and its Kantian form he successfully attacks; but to the other two he is more tender, and he states their case with a generosity

which is sometimes equivalent to overstatement. For instance, the argument derived from evolution against pessimism is presented in a form which makes it easy to overthrow; the real argument, that our standards of what is rational are themselves the outcome of the struggle for survival, is neglected. Even the theory propounded is offered only as an alternative and upon the assumption that the world is rational. In the end, only an act of philosophic faith can justify us in accepting as certain the hypothetical conclusions. Alas for the insecurity with which human convictions about God, the world, and immortality are founded.

The second of his three books, that in which the author expounds the method of metaphysics, appears to be, on the whole, the most useful portion of the work. He calls his metaphysics the metaphysics of evolution. He wants to get a philosophy which shall accord with the results of the natural and other sciences, and he lays down the important principle that metaphysics must be based upon the sciences and must contain the ultimate truths to which they lead. He has done good service by calling attention to Mr. Crookes's profound theory of *protyle*, which philosophers have left strangely unnoticed. He tries to find a comprehensive formula which shall replace Mr. Spencer's famous law. But his conception of a theory of evolution is different in many points from the predominant conception. First of all he treats the evolution as tending necessarily to some end (though of course not an end external to the process), and therefore finite; and, secondly, he holds that the lower forms are to be interpreted by the higher. Neither of these principles seems to be proved; each of them appears, to me at least, to be a dogma. The weak point of the method is, however, that the author neglects or fails to do justice to the characteristic feature of the process of evolution, which is not that there is evolution, but that the evolution takes place by natural selection. Yet the frank avowal by a metaphysician that metaphysics is but science at a higher power is valuable and important.

The staple questions of metaphysics, the soul, God, the world, are discussed in the last of the three books. Acute reasoning and trenchant criticism abound; the polemic against pantheism is specially convincing. The dominant note of the system is the finite. God, the world, space, and time have all been believed to be infinite. The author holds them to be finite, and his arguments are full of weight. Yet finite as all these are, the end of the evolution is described, something in the manner of Aristotle, as a state of perpetual activity of rest, a state of Being which is the goal of Becoming. It is difficult to see in what way this is different from infinity. The other feature of the system is its theory of monads. The author takes his stand upon the consciousness of self as something of which we cannot doubt. Yet he knows recent psychological work well enough to see that the self is not complete at any one time; and he regards the real self as the "I, with all its powers and latent capacities of development." God is a self which interacts with our human selves, and all our experience consists of this interaction. Where, then, is matter? The author seems to leave it an open question whether the atoms are themselves monads of an inferior order of consciousness, or merely the effect of the divine force. This latter alternative is not clear, and it is still less clear that the question which alternative is adopted is, as the author thinks, not of vital importance.

But into the details of all these discussions, and especially into the solution

offered of the problem of immortality, the reader must be left to inquire. He will find the whole well worth reading. But I do not conceal my own distrust of this metaphysical construction. The author seems to have deserted his perception that metaphysics is really founded upon the conclusions of science, and to have joined the band of constructors of unverified hypotheses. Time may perhaps be the "corruption of eternity," "the impermanence of the eternal," but does this formula teach us anything? How are time and space related to the phenomena of consciousness by which we become aware of them? The theory of monads is worked out with great ingenuity, but it raises many questions. Is it true that the consciousness of self is something so sure, so peculiarly and individually sure, that it can fitly be made the starting-point of a philosophy? Am I better conscious of myself than of the things outside me? To raise this doubt is a very necessary heresy. But even if we overlook this, on what grounds can we assume that other persons besides myself are real selves? The author appears to evade this question, though he very ingeniously uses the analogy of identical illusions produced by the operator in several hypnotized persons at the same time, to illustrate how the same material world may be "suggested" by God to all selves. There seems, indeed, to be wanting throughout the book a proper appreciation of normal psychological data. As our minds are the sources of all that we know, we must surely make the connection clear between how we come to know all things and what things really are. And in conclusion, although the principle of interpreting the lower by the higher naturally leads us to think of matter as being in its real nature spiritual, or at least the effect of spirit (and the author has many suggestive remarks upon the fact that we are burdened with material bodies), what is gained by this if matter is still so entirely unlike spirit? But it is ungracious to dwell upon objections in a notice which has not been long enough to give even a bare outline of the contents of a book which every one who reads, even if he does not assent to the whole, will enjoy.

S. ALEXANDER.

FINAL CAUSES: A REFUTATION. By Walthen Mark Wilks Call, M.A. London: Kegan, Paul & Co., 1891.

This little posthumous volume may be safely commended to all thoughtful readers, as presenting a clear and convincing proof of the futility of applying Theistic conceptions to the Universe, with its mystery of good and evil. Probably no book has ever issued from the press that more completely and concisely sums up the process by which many thinkers in modern times have been led to reject such conceptions.

The author begins with a sketch of the historical development of the hypothesis of a Divine Intelligence transforming original chaos into a world of order. He then proceeds to give a careful examination of the design argument in all its phases. The order of nature is shown to be defective, involving waste and destruction; and it is argued that, if we assume the existence of a Divine Artificer, we must deny either His benevolence or His omnipotence.

Mr. Call, though an acute and original thinker, was not a professed metaphysician, and does not deal with all the more recent phases of thought on the subject of Final Causes. From a scientific point of view, therefore, the essay